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REFLECTIONS ON APARTHEID AFTER THE
SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES
JULIUS STONE*
South Africa was given the mandate over South West Africa by the
Covenant of the League of Nations. While individual members of the
League had no role in the administrative process of the mandate, it contained provisions protecting the interests of third party States, and article
7 of the mandate gave jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice
over "disputes" between any member of the League and the mandatory
power in relation to the mandate. The mandate and its obligations were
continued after the formation of the United Nations but frequent disputes
in that body left doubt upon the U.N.'s ability to compel the cessation of
of apartheid in South West Africa. In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia brought
suit against South Africa in the International Court of Justice alleging
breaches of the mandate. South Africa denied the Courts jurisdictionbut
two years later the Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge and heard
the case on the merits, renderingits decision in 1966. The Court did not,
however, reach the central issue of whether South Afric's policies of
apartheid abused the mandate. The case was dismissed on the grounds
that the claimants had "not established any legal right or interest in the
subject-matter of their claims" sufficient to bring suit. This decision was
reached only after a tie-breaking second ballot was cast by the President
of the Court-asituation due, in part, to the replacement on the Court of
two judges who in 1962 had taken a stand probably adverse to the position of South Africa in the 1966 case.

The raucous and unseemly controversy which arose on July 18,
1966, when the President of the International Court of Justice handed
down the majority decision in the South West Africa Cases, is still with
us. Certain assumptions punctuate the massive criticism of the 1966
decision. On the legal side they charge that: (1) the narrow majority
of the 1966 decision was politically and not legally motivated; (2) the
1966 decision reversed the 1962 decision, and by this fact violated the
principle of res judicata, embodied in article 60 of the statute, that
judgments of the Court are final and conclusive; (3) even if a legal
basis can be found for the 1966 decision, this would be a hair-splitting
technical one, unworthy of the greatness of the Court and of the issue.
On the political side the assumptions charge that: (1) The Court
failed to seize an opportunity to contribute to reduction of the interna*D.C.L., Oxford; S.J.D., Harvard; Challis Professor of International Law and
jurisprudence, University of Sydney; Distinguished Visiting Professor, University
of Washington, 1966-67.
This article is the text of one of the Hammarskj6ld Memorial Lectures, 1967,
delivered by Professor Stone at the University of Washington on May 2, 1967.
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tional tensions surrounding these grave matters; (2) the Court grossly
defaulted in its duty to secure human rights in one of the most challenging situations facing the United Nations; (3) the Court failed to
seize a most notable chance of fixing and reinforcing the allegiance of
scores of new African and Asian States to international law and the
Court itself, and indeed positively undermined what respect the Court
already enjoyed; (4) some of the judges ranged themselves in a rearguard action against human rights and colonialism as if they were
minions of South Africa and other darkly hinted-at Western Powers.
My main concern in this paper is not with the legal technicalities of
the 1962 and 1966 decisions, although I will permit myself a few brief
preliminary observations on this score. Those who scorn the 1966 decision, as arising from a chance change of personnel due to intervening
death of the Egyptian judge, should (I think) remember that even the
1962 decision was a close eight to seven decision, and that the full
complement of permanent judges did not sit then either. If we impute
political neocolonialist motives to the majority of 1966, we need to
remember that the Polish judge was among that majority. Moreover,
since the main legal principles involved had already been clarified in
advisory opinions of the early 1950's, it could also be argued that the
Liberian and Ethiopian applications to the Court, largely instigated by
the Organization of African Unity, were themselves designed to use the
Court as a tool of political pressure, rather than of legal exegesis. It
also needs pointing out that, contrary to general assumption, the main
thrust of the 1966 majority decision was neither as to the question of
jurisdiction, nor as to locus standi of parties. It was rather that the
applicants "had not established any legal right or interest in the subject
matter of their claims," or, as a common law judge would say, they had
not established their "cause of acton." Finally (without seeking to be
exhaustive) it needs adding that long standing positions of the Court
on the relation of preliminary holdings on jurisdiction, to decisions on
the merits in the same case, are quite tolerant of the Court departing
in its later decision on the merits from positions tentatively taken for
the limited purpose of merely deciding whether it has jurisdiction to
proceed to hear argument on the merits. This possibility arises wherever the same questions of fact or law are involved in both the determination of jurisdiction and that of the merits.
However it be as to the legal controversies surrounding the South
West Africa Cases, South African leaders, whether the late Prime
Minister Verwoerd or Prime Minister Vorster, have made their elated
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interpretation (legally and also morally ill-founded) of the majority
decision, as a vindication of their policies. Liberia and Ethiopia, and
other States of the Organization of African Unity, have joined (with
anger instead of elation) in that interpretation, and have intensified by
this anger and frustration their smouldering resentments against South
African policies. Emanations of their resentments now also envelop
(by reasonings also rather ill-founded) States like Australia and the
United Kingdom, on grounds of the nationality of majority judges.
(One wonders, as I have said, how the position of the judge of Polish
nationality is fitted into this resentment.) After this decision distrust
of international law and the World Court in the new African States, as
well as those of Asia, has tended to turn into fierce conviction that the
dice are somehow loaded against them in this traditionally Western
arena of conflict settlement.
The present reflections aim to set this emotive aftermath of the
1966 decision as well as some of the legal technicalities involved, into
a somewhat broader context. They are concerned with questions transcending (I believe) both the political hopes of the litigants and the
technical legal arguments, in directions not sufficiently agitated in the
aftermath of the 1966 decision. No doubt it is to be expected that
national political leaders and spokesmen will long maintain the protests and animosities which followed the South West Africa decision.
Such protests appeared (with demands for the intensification of United
Nations measures against South Africa and for the establishment of
the independence of South West Africa) at the General Assembly in
1966. And the 14-nation committee of that Assembly which deliberated in the early months of 1967 on the practical means of bringing independence to South West Africa presented conclusions to the current
Special Session of the General Assembly.
Yet, there are far more important issues than any immediate repercussions of political sentiment and protest or diplomatic action. Therefore, before the anguish of this international cause celebre fades too
much, we ought to seek its meaning for other international conflicts of
our day, including future states of the conflicts surrounding South
African policies.
I.

VALUES AT STAKE IN THIS LITIGATION

I address myself then in particular to the likely aftermath of this
case for three important values which it placed at stake: (1) the welfare of the inhabitants of South West Africa; (2) the abatement of
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international tensions; and (3) the encouragement of State acceptance
of third party judgment and the strengthening of the International
Court of Justice.
First, there is the welfare and advancement of the indigenous inhabitants of South West and South Africa as related to apartheid
policy. Could there really have been reason to hope, in the period
during which the possibility of contentious proceedings was being considered in the General Assembly and its relevant committee, and in
the Organization of African Unity Conference at Addis Ababa, that
the judgment applied for by Liberia and Ethiopia would increase the
chances of securing South African compliance with the applicable
principles of human rights?
It was common knowledge in 1960 that for more than a decade the
majority of members of the General Assembly had already been trying
to bring all available pressures, moral, diplomatic, economic and political, and even threats of physical force, against South Africa, inside
and outside the United Nations. Could there then have been reason to
hope that even the clearest judgment of the Court against apartheid
could transform (or quickly open up ways of transforming) this factual situation? Presumably not even the applicant states entertained
the naive expectation that a condemnatory judgment, if obtained,
would meet with meek South African legal compliance.
If, as is more likely, the hope of the litigant states and their instigators was that successful litigation might provide a political handle for
more effective United Nations action, especially as regards South West
Africa, this would be less sanguine, but still rather debatable.
Conceivably some increase in effectiveness from a Court judgment
might have been hoped for because the Security Council has power
under article 94(2) of the Charter to adopt measures to give effect to a
binding judgment. Yet this is only a discretionary power, not a mandatory duty of the Security Council, and is subject to the veto. And
unless the past history of Security Council attitudes under article
94(2) is discounted, the mere fact that the judgment (as opposed to
the earlier advisory opinions) is legally binding, could not of itself be
counted on to exclude possible vetoes.
The applicant States may, however, have hoped that a Court judgment, added to the series of General Assembly and Security Council
condemnations of South Africa, would have had precisely this effect.
Yet even this hope does not seem to have had much real foundation in
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the light of current postures of the veto-bearing powers on related
issues touching apartheid in South Africa itself. All the four Security
Council resolutions between Sharpville in 1960 and 1966 have shown,
it is true, substantial unanimity in condemning South Africa's apartheid policy and even denouncing it as disturbing the peace. A no less
crucial fact, however, is that while asserting on these occasions that
there was a "disturbance of the peace," the resolutions studiously had
to avoid, in order to escape being vetoed, the language of "threat to
the peace," "breach of the peace," "act of aggression" which would
activate the Security Council's enforcement powers.
It was well understood on all sides, for example, that what blocked
the activist finding and a sanctions resolution on June 18, 1964 was the
likely negative votes of no less than three veto-bearing powers. The
United States, United Kingdom and France made this clear enough in
their explanations of vote. France abstained even from a resolution
aimed only at study of the question of sanctions. The Soviet and Czech
representatives explained their abstentions as protests against these
positions.
It is possible, no doubt, that the African states hoped that a Court
judgment on the merits would somehow succeed in nudging the Security
Council into enforcement action, certainly as to South West Africa,
and perhaps also as to apartheid generally. To be realized, however,
this hope would have to mean that potential vetoing powers would be
induced not to veto. In the light of the preceding history there is little
reason to expect such a reversal of vetoing attitudes. It is true that in
an aide-memoire to Pretoria on July 15, 1966, Washington affirmed
that it would "feel obligated to support" the then shortly forthcoming
judgment of the Court. Yet in the consequent exchange after the
judgment was given, the United States also supported the authority of
the existing advisory opinions of 1950, 1955 and 1956, covering the
merits of substantially the same issues raised in the South West Africa
Cases. So that it is difficult to think that the United States would
have dropped all reservations towards future Security Council action,
merely because a new judgment now covered the merits of issues already substantially covered by existing advisory opinions which it regarded as authoritative. On October 27, 1966, despite the full warmth
of General Assembly consensus against South Africa, the United States
representative was still at pains to make clear that it had, by its concurrence, "undertaken no commitment" as to the "action" which would
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be "appropriate" if the matter were raised in the Security Council.*
My point is, in short, that no serious ground exists, in the above circumstances, for saying that the Court's failure to speak in 1966 on
the merits of the issues in question was decisive as to the continuance
of the United States reservations (and therefore of its potential veto
in the Security Council). And this point is reinforced by the nonmandatory character, in any case, of the Security Council's powers
under article 94(2) of the Charter.
Certain differences in the South West Africa Case, as distinct from
apartheid problems in South Africa itself could, indeed, conceivably
ground hope of at least a degree of success in hard bargaining concerning the future of the territory, especially with the aid of a favorable Court judgment on the merits. For example, the South West
Africa Case itself, as distinct from the general apartheid issue, had not
yet been before the Security Council, and, in the South West Africa
Case, apartheid would only be one of several issues.
Yet it must still be regarded as highly likely that vetoes which
would bar enforcement-authorizing findings of "threat to the peace"
under chapter VII concerning apartheid, would equally restrain use of
the Security Council's discretionary powers to enforce a Court judgment under article 94(2).
In the background of all sensible calculation, indeed, whether as to
bargaining with South Africa, or enforcement against her, and (though
no doubt in different degrees) as to both the South West Africa and
general apartheid issues, is the hard reality stated by Sir Patrick Dean
at the ll31st meeting of the Security Council on June 15, 1964, from
which Mr. Adlai Stevenson's statement of American problems was not
very different. (The French resistance to sanctions proposals was if
anything even more adament.) This was that since economic enforcement measures alone were not likely to bring South Africa to renounce
apartheid policies, the Security Council ought, before introducing them,
to decide squarely whether it was prepared to act under article 42 and
"attempt by force" to compel this.
Behind the word "attempt" lie grave doubts as to how and even
whether the necessary force to compel renunciation could be brought to
bear. It seems clear that military participation of major Soviet, American, British or French forces would either not be forthcoming or
would (where forthcoming) be unacceptable either to the African
States themselves or to the non-participating great powers.
* See the correspondence in 61 Am. J. Int'l. L. 597 (1967).
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Could a force of merely the Congo or Cyprus type, made up of
African, Norwegian, Canadian, Indian or similar small-power contingents, possibly suffice for the major military offensive necessary
against South Africa? Could such a force break the will of an economically powerful South African Government, supported by a stubborn and staunchly loyal white population, and backed by powerful
military and police forces? The admirable studies of Amelia Leiss and
Howard Taubenfeld do not seem optimistic on this point; and I am
constrained to agree with them.
So much then as to the prospects of advancing Bantu rights and
welfare through this litigation, the first of the three conceivable bases
for bringing it.
Second, now, what of the abatement of tension as a goal?
In the instant situation, where a power confrontation with South
Africa thus did not seem possible, importance may have been attached,
even then, to the value of a legal judgment for abating the surrounding
tensions, and thus facilitating fruitful negotiations. Was it to be expected whatever the judges did, that the applications could abate
tensions between South Africa and other States, and thereby increase
the chances of favorable negotiations? The answer seems to be that
even if judgment had gone against South Africa, as it did in Judge
Jessup's dissent, this would probably have left South Africa's position
as hard as ever, without increasing her exposure to enforcement action
against apartheid. And I doubt whether, thereafter, for reasons I shall
give in a moment, the general acceptability of the International Court
of justice to the African States would have been increased.
This brings me frontally to the third question. What was the range
of foresight in 1960 as to the effect of this litigation on the International Court, for example, in placing the Court and its law, however
inadvertently, in the position of scapegoats for situations which they
could not be expected to resolve?
I accept unhesitatingly the fact that one great question mark about
this law and this court concerns their acceptability to the new nations.
But let us suppose that the Court had done all that Liberia and
Ethiopia requested by way of judgment against South Africa. The
hard reality that enforcement of the judgment would probably prove
impossible would still have remained. It is thus probable that the
Court would, even then, have become exposed to increased scorn and
hostility of the new states, though now on grounds of impotence,
rather than of bias or cowardice. Conversely, I should perhaps add
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that had the court, in 1962, and without delaying to 1966, rejected the
jurisdiction, Liberian, Ethiopian and Afro-Asian indignation would
have been little less than it has been in 1966. The alleged inconsistency
and the lapse of time between the 1962 and 1966 positions, though the
butt of much criticism, are only aggravating factors in this aspect.
They are not of its essence.
Again, let us suppose that in 1966 the Court majority had proceeded
to the merits, but had taken the view that since earlier advisory opinions had already affirmed that South Africa's obligations survived
under the mandate, and that the supervisory authority was inherited
by the United Nations, the Court should regard itself as already having
vindicated (so far as it could) the general humanitarian interests inspiring the Liberian and Ethiopian applications, and limited itself
therefore to reaffirming its earlier opinions. This, too, would have left
the applicant States and other African States frustrated and angry.
What I have here offered for consideration is the possibility that, on
any reasonable assessment made in 1960, resort to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction for condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policy could not reasonably have been expected to improve the lot of the
Bantus; nor to decrease surrounding international tensions; nor to
strengthen the prospects of the Court or the rule of law in international
relations.
II.

NEGLECT OF MORE MODEST BUT MORE HOPEFUL APPROACHES

Thus far I have been pinpointing the negative evils, the absence of
imagined goods, associated with invocation of compulsory judicial jurisdiction in cases of a certain kind. We need also to recognize certain
more positive evils which may result from such proceedings and which
should have been foreseeable.
One of these certainly may be an undue neglect of other possible
approaches to the South African problem focusing on concrete limited
tasks of improving the conditions and development of Bantu peoples,
essential to the long-term objective of ending apartheid. On this last
level it is certainly not beyond reasonable hope that the general pressures of world opinion, and the special neighborhood pressures from
African States, not to speak of the South African manifest special concern and helpfulness towards the now emancipated Basutoland and
Bechuanaland, could by apt measures be transmuted progressively into
specific advances for the human beings involved. Certainly this kind
of possibility should be brought into fuller view as major field of effort
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additional to mere hammering on the granite door of South African
apartheid policy, which experience shows we presently lack either a
key to open or the strength to break.
Another positive evil from such litigation is the continued freezing
of adversary postures, the increase of tensions, with little if any resulting advantage, when the best hope of progress towards solutions may
lie in the reduction of tensions, as a step towards extracting the kind of
piecemeal advances above envisaged.
To say all this is not to impugn the sincerity of Liberia and Ethiopia
in beginning these proceedings, much less to justify apartheid policies.
But must we not be more concerned with feasible long-term approaches
to the ending of apartheid rather than with mere release of indignation,
however genuine, concerning it? And, conversely, must we not concern
ourselves with the effects of a course of action on international law
and institutions, rather than with the gratification or humiliation of
particular States or viewpoints?
Let me now put these matters in more general terms. The South
West Africa Case, like the Goa Case before it, raises in acute form the
problem of "nonjusticiable" disputes brought before the International
Court. By this I mean disputes in which the States concerned regard
the interests involved as important enough to override any existing
condition of the law, and any obligations based on it.
We need reminding, I believe, that the fact that the term "vital interests" has become rather old-fashioned and discredited does not release our generation from the hard truths to which the term referred.
These hard truths are still with us. One of them is that with any
nation, a frontal verbal attack on what it sees as its major commitments of policy or principle is likely, unless that verbal attack is
backed by manifest power, to meet (and indeed to provoke) only
intransigence. Another is that many of the disputes which have built
up the present tensions between the great powers are precisely of the
"nonjusticiable" nature here under discussion. State refusal to entrust
such conflicts, which are the ones which most threaten peace, to third
party determination, is another hard fact of international life. When
we act or even believe this wishfully as if this fact of life did not exist,
life has its revenge. For the belief is no mere innocuous illusion. It is
not merely that we do not in fact settle such conflicts by these unavailable means. It is also that often we thereby fail to do what might be
possible to mitigate them by other means, for instance, by abating or
diverting or transmuting or delaying demands, and extracting and re-
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ceiving compensating concessions for this. Whether we consider particular conflicts like those of Goa or South West Africa, or international conflicts in general and their threats to survival, the hard truths
and their consequences remain in the peace-threatening conflicts. If
decisive power to cut through them is not available and direct paths
are blocked by power, movement towards adjustment is unlikely to
come from speciously tidy and definitive designs for decision by impartial judges under "the rule of law."
It is more likely to come if peoples and their governments, whether
Western or African or Asian, while still moving towards the highest
principles, learn to move towards these as opportunity offers through
more specific goals and demands. Of the various lines of General
Assembly and Organization of African Unity efforts against South
Africa in the past, those which have focused on such specific improvements are surely now the most hopeful for the future. On this and
other problems such efforts should be persistently intensified with endless patience, as well as endless courage. This kind of counsel may
seem to turn hard legal and political questions into mere appeals to the
heart and spirit. But I believe the very opposite is the truth. What
such a view finally leads to is really rather tough thinking, in which
idealism is disciplined and attuned to work in the environment which
it cannot in any case escape and can only slowly mold.
If in these conflicts with South Africa demands could be narrowed
and refrained in terms of more specific and more step-by-step objectives, major gains, instead of mere tension-ridden stalemates, might
yet be registered. I mean, of course, objectives of progressively improving standards of life, educational advancement and employment
opportunity, and training for self-government, to be assured to the
Bantus according to negotiated and then persistently renegotiated timetables.
One gain might be that a South African government might feel able
to negotiate and make concessions on such particular matters, whereas
at present, in terms of the apartheid principle, a government which
was even disposed to make concessions would fear that it could not
maintain itself in office. There might then be some hope of escaping
from the kind of dilemma in which we seem at present caught, at least
on the general apartheid issue, namely, that a South African government which is to maintain itself domestically feels that it must stand
pat on an issue framed in terms of apartheid; while conversely, the
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survival of a government which did not so stand would be dubious.
Such Bantu advancements in standards of life, educational advancement, employment and organizing capacity must obviously be important factors in the eventual defeat of apartheid, however and whenever
this is to come. Even in terms of ending apartheid it would be an indubitable gain for instance to increase the number of Africans in
South Africa who receive an education at all from the levels (as offered
by Robert Kennedy in 1966) of one in three, or those who enter high
school from the level of one in 26, or those who enter the university
from one in 762. Pressures in this direction could make wise use of
rather adamant imperatives of the South African economy itself, which
demand progressive integration of the indigenous labor force for increasing levels of skilled tasks, and the higher educational standards
thus implied.
United Nations activity before and even during the 1960-66 litigation has (as above observed) addressed itself to some specific matters
of Bantu welfare and development, alongside the general anti-apartheid campaign. There was, for example, a proposal for an education
and training program for indigenous peoples of South Africa in the
Secretary-General's Report of 1964. Since 1961 the General Assembly
has also interested itself in affording overseas educational facilities for
South West African students; various specialized agencies have addressed themselves to helping victims of apartheid; and attempts have
been made (ineffectually as yet owing to legal difficulties) to bring
South West Africa, as well as Angola and Mozambique, within the
ambit of the Economic Commission for Africa. My present plea is for
systematic intensification, elaboration, continuance and extension of
range of such efforts.
III.

APARTHEID AND OUR MoRAL DUTIES

I share the indignation with which African and Asian as well as
Western States and peoples, confront the spectacle of law degraded
into a mere tyrannical instrument of a selfish status quo. Let me now
turn, therefore, from issues of law, politics and power directly to certain issues of moral duty.
If even the most elementary principles of humanity and of political
and civil liberty could marshal their own self-vindicating power, the
inhumanities of apartheid, like those of Nazi race doctrine, and many
other state barbarisms, could be dealt with through traditional doc-
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trines of intervention on grounds of humanity. Yet history unhappily
suggests that States which marshal decisive military power, such as
the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France,
are most unlikely to accept major military commitments merely for
the vindication of these great principles. Even with the still unparalleled Nazi barbarisms, what brought military commitments was not
Nazi abominations at home, but their ambitious adventures abroad.
The hard core of the problem which now confronts the world in
South Africa was well posed by the Soviet representative M. Fedorenko
on June 15, 1964, at the ll31st meeting of the Security Council. He
quoted the then recent words of South Africa's Ambassador in London,
Mr. de Wet: "My Government stands immovable on our birthright as
a distinct white nation to survive and rule in those parts of South
Africa which we have settled and civilized." Mr. Fedorenko commented: "But does the indigenous population not have the right to
stand and battle for the vital interests acquired by birth in that very
country... ?"
It is only after we have given an emphatic positive answer to this
rhetorical question, that we face the core problem-What can be the
effective strategy and tactics of such a battle, where each domestic
antagonist regards its very survival as at stake, and yet the outside
supporters of the weaker party either lack the power, or lack the motivation, to undertake the major military commitments necessary to
change the situation?
To evade the questions whether the strategy and tactics of the past
19 years have failed, and have even entrenched further the domination of the South African Government, without much material, social
or political advancement of the indigenous population, and what focal
change may now be necessary, may be to sacrifice these peoples to
the indulgence of our emotions. It is here that we confront certain
moral perplexities to which I finally come.
If, indeed, continued evasion of the above questions threatens these
peoples with future decades as barren for them as the two past, does
not this impose a duty on everyone concerned to re-examine the present
situation with full honesty even at some risk of initial misunderstanding by others? It can be hoped, perhaps that at any rate the more
thoughtful opponents of apartheid will not misunderstand, and that,
for the rest, initial misunderstanding may finally yield to more fruitful
second thoughts. What is morally important, in any case, is not the
danger of misunderstanding, but that use be made of the present
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critical stage to explore openmindedly what next steps are feasible for
furthering the human and international concerns which move us.
The readjustment of focus called for does not require us to abandon
long-term visions of the abolition of apartheid and the triumph of
human brotherhood over hate and fear and cruelty. What it seeks is
enhancement of the understanding, resourcefulness and patience, by
which these visions can be approached. On this approach it would be
more than ever essential that those states which are in a position to do
so should use their special bonds with South Africa both within United
Nations collective effort, and in bilateral contacts, to promote and press
for that State's acceptance of concrete measures implied in the longterm vision.
Such efforts should concentrate, in the first instance, on achieving a
settlement of the future of South West Africa, on which South Africa's
position may be somewhat less adament than on the apartheid issue at
home. Advances in South West Africa should be seen as important
both for their own sake and as bearing also in the long term on the
apartheid policy generally. Further, inability or unwillingness of the
great powers to join in military enforcement of demands on South
Africa for abolition of apartheid, imposes on them a heavy duty of ensuring progress by other means. Their responsibility then becomes
even heavier to secure South African cooperation in limited but cumulating measures for the material, social, educational and organizational
advancement of the indigenous peoples.
Finally, collective United Nations efforts should, while maintaining
the basic principles at stake, also direct themselves urgently to bridging
the gap, by the kind of concrete proposals of which I have spoken,
between the present impasse and the future vindication of these principles. For this purpose there is need to formulate carefully but
imaginatively, and to press upon the South African Government, concrete measures which, though limited to what is feasible from year to
year will still, as the developing situation permits, produce an ever
fuller realization of the U.N. Charter's ideals of equality and liberty
of all men.
The moral perplexities which thus face all of us who oppose apartheid cannot lightly be brushed aside. As far as can be seen, the end
of apartheid cannot be brought about for at least a decade, if not a
generation. Are we not required in the interim to do all that is humanly
possible to improve the conditions of the indigenous peoples, especially
in those respects implied in our very opposition to apartheid?
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This, I would submit, is a moral imperative which neither impairs,
nor is impaired by, recognition of the imperatives demanding full
human equality and freedom, and therefore the full abolition of apartheid. For the choice of values now (when this full abolition still
lies beyond existing or foreseeable power) is not between action that
can end apartheid and assure full liberty and equality, on the one hand,
and the assurance, on the other, of the kind of advancements here
discussed. It is rather a choice between abandoning the peoples concerned to an apartheid we admittedly lack any early power to end,
on the one hand, and striving on the other to assure to them by all
available pressures maximum advancements at maximum pace in
abatement of apartheid; advancements which may also, if wisely
planned and steadily pressed, bring the day of abolition nearer.
This approach does not naively presuppose any sudden change of
heart by those who govern South Africa. Nor does it assume naivet6
in their preception of the drive of our demands. What it assumes is
that confrontation is more likely to give results on issues on which the
men in power can yield and still survive in power. It also assumes that
South African leaders will buy time at a price helpful to the cause of
the Bantus, if we direct sufficient pressures at issues of this kind. Conversely this approach should forbid us to reject proposals out of hand
merely because they are made by South African leaders and fall short
of full demands for abolition of apartheid. Be these proposals for
limited self-rule as in the Transkei within South Africa, or for assistance to new states like Botswana, or current proposals for assisting
Ovamboland in South West Africa towards self-government, we have a
duty (I believe) to seek and seize from them whatever gains they offer
for the indigenous peoples.
Moral duty towards the Bantu peoples, in short (it seems to me)
demands immediate primacy for whatever partial but cumulative steps
we can make towards their emancipation. And this is so especially
when (as I believe) mere indulgence of our deep moral repugnance to
apartheid and all its works can promise them but further barrenness
of years.

